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THE DYNAMICS OF YUGOSLAV RELIGIOUS POLICY:
SOME INSIGHTS FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY*
by Pedro Ramet
Pedro Rame t , a native of London , England , c ompleted his
undergraduate studies in philosophy at Stanford University,
earned his master 's degree in international relations
through the University of Arkansas , and received his Ph. D.
in political science in 1981 from UCLA. He is the author of
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1 9 63 -198 3 ( Indiana
University Press , 1 984 ) and Cross Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Unio n (Indiana University Press , forthcoming) , and
editor of Religion ·and Nationalism in Soviet and East Euro
pean Politics ( Duke University Press, 1984) and Yugoslavia
in the 1 980s (Westview Press, 1985).
This essay was origi
nally published as a chapter in the last mentioned book, and
appears here by permission of the author and of Westview
Press .
In approaching the subject of religious policy, there are several
questions with which one is confronted.

First , should religious

policy be treated as an autonomous issue area in isolation from other
issue areas, or should it be interpreted with attention to a purported
organic relationship with o ther issue areas , such as nationalities
policy , educational policy , foreign policy , and so forth ?

Second ,

should policy in general, and religious policy in specific, be seen as
the r�sult of a factionalized environment or as the product of a
system in which internal c onflicts are of n o policy importance ?
Third, should policy be seen as the product of clear objectives or as
a complex outcome of sundry variables?

Fourth,

does the policy of a

given organizatio n , in this case the League of Communists of Yugo
slavia (LCY),
space ?

tend toward consistency or inconsistency over time and

And fifth, is religious policy (in Yugoslavia) best viewed as

an output of the system as a whole or in terms of the separate policy
m�king of the system's federal sub-units?

In the following pages ,

I

shall argue that Yugoslav religious policy is better understo od in
,

terms of the complex side of these alternatives and that , in this
regard , it is a typical Yugoslav policy sphere. I shall also argue
that organization theory can be useful to highlight some structural
and behavioral facets of Yugoslav religious policy.
Organization theory is concerned, among other things, with elabo
rating the environment in which decisions are made and policies car
ried out.

It assumes the necessity of some principle of hierarchy and

of a division of labor, and a purposiveness in organizational beha 
vior. 1 Some of the insights gained from organization the ory are , I
2

3

believe ,

helpful in understanding the dynamics of Yugoslav religious

policy-making.

At the same time, the evidence from the Yugoslav case

is germane �o an assessment of the relative appli�ability of alternate
.

'

theories of organization.

'

Fred Luthans outlines fou� distinct approaches in. organization
theory. 2 Classical bureaucratic theory, which may be associated with
Max Weber , Peter M. Blau , and Robert Michels , presents a mechanical
model of bureaucracy, in which the tendency to oligarchy is sometimes
seen as irresistible. 3 Behavioral theory , which may b e associated
with James G. March,

Herbert A. Simon , and Philip Selznick,

stresses

the role of people , their perceptions and motivations , in organiza

tional behavior and policy-making.4

Behavioral theory stresses or

ganizational structure in both its formal and informal aspects.

Sys

tems theory stresses the input-output aspect of organizational beha
vior,

as well as the interrelatedness and interdependence of elements

in the whole.

Systems theory is concerned, then, with identifying the

"strategic" points in the system,

the "nature of their mutual depen

dency, " the processes which link the system together, and the goals of
the system as a whole.5 And finally, contingency theory , which may be
associated with Joan Woodward, William L. Zwerman, Paul L. Lawrence ,
and Jay w. Lorsch, urges that environmental factors such a s , speci
fically, technology, may be more important than organizational struc
ture and processes for organizational output.

The findings o·f Law

rence and Lorsch may be summarized as follows:
1.

If the environment is uncertain and heterogeneous,

organization should be relatively unstructured.
2.

•

•

then the

•

If the environment is stable and homogeneous , then a rigid

organization structure is appropriate.
3.

If the external environment is very diverse and the internal

environment is highly differentiated , then there must b e very
elaborate integrating mechanisms in that organization structure.6
While all of these theories have something to offer, the b ehavioral
variant seems especially well suited to the Yugoslav case , and most of
the citations from organization theory, in what follows , come from
behavioralists.
The Institutional Setting
The regim e 's relations with religious b odies are conducted
through two parallel structures.

On the one hand ,

there are the

republican Offices for Relations with Religious Communities, which are
nominally subordinate to the Federal Office for Relations with Reli
gious Communities,
via,

but which are, like almost everything in Yugosla

actually run by the respective republic governments.

Alongsi�e

these offices are similar ones established under the rubric of �he

4

Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) and its
republic branches.

These are separately staffe d , but j udging from

their activity and from the frequency of mention in the press , it
seems clear that the governmental offices play a more important role
in the day-to-day management of Church-state relations.
In form,

this has the appearance of hierarchical subordination.

In practice , each republic has its own separate legislation regarding
religion, which differs in particulars �rom republic to republic, 7 and

hence the guidelines, under which each republican Office for Relations
with Religious Communities operates, differ.
While the party itself has , technically speaking� n o formal
apparatus for co ordinating its religious policy , it exerts its in
fluence indirectly through the aforementioned agencies and also
through the press, · which has often served as the vehicle for express
ing party views on the sub j ect of religion.

And finally, the Marxist

intellectual community , most especially sociologists concerned with
religion, contribute to the understanding of religion in Yugoslavia
and thus to defining the contours of religious policy in that country.
Add to this federalization the confessional heterogeneity in the
country and one arrives at a strong expectation that religious policy
will have distinct differences from one republic to the next.

This

expectation seems to be b orne out by the evidence.
In Macedonia and Slovenia , Church-state relations are c ordial ,
and in Macedonia one may even speak of a certain warmth in the rela
tionship.

Indeed, the regime was strongly supportive of the creation

of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church in 1967, seeing in this
ecclesiastical structure an instrument in its polemic with Bulgaria
over the ethnicity of the Macedonians.

In the Slovenian instance ,

although Catholic clergy there have occasionally spoken out on human
rights issues and on the sub j ect of "atheization" in the scho ols , on
the whole Church-state relations are relatively uncomplicated.
The situations in these two republics are comparable in another
respect, viz., the relative absence of factionalization on either side
of the equation.

The Macedonian political elite has every reason to

support the Macedonian Orthodox Church , since b oth are wary of Bulgarian pretensions (Bulgaria asserts that Macedonians are merely Bul
garians) , and there is no evidence of any division within the Mace
danian political elite on the subject of religious policy.

Similarly,

the Macedonian Orthodox Church, finding its au.tocephaly repudiated by
8
the Serbian Orthodox Church, looks to the republican government for
support; none of the Macedonian clergy have lleen involve d , thu s , in
politically controversial activities.
Factionalization is also absent, as mentioned, in Slovenia.

The

Slovenian party organization is dominated b y "liberals" and it has

·
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been years since there have been reports of any anti-Church directives
i n that republic.

And while the same cannot b e said of the Catholic

Church--the only religious organization that counts for anything in
Slovenia--its '�rogressiv�' wing, represented in Slovenia largely by
Bishop Vekoslav Grmic, 9 is of no particular significance. In Slo
venia , as in Macedonia , thus , there are strong sources of impetus
toward cooperation, and Church-state relations in these republics are
organizationally simpler.
The Macedonian Orthodox Church is not the only religious organi
zation in whose prosperity the LCY has had a vested interest.

A

flourishing Islamic community i� important to the regime both because
the regime has wanted to stimulate a Muslim ethnic consciousness among
Bosnian Muslims and because of the importance which Yugoslavia places
on its ties with the Arab world.

In recent years, ho�ever, there have

been repeated symptoms of rising Muslim assertiveness , including calls
for a Muslim cultural society (which the regime will not allow),

and

demands for the redesignation of Bosnia as a "Muslim Republic," which
is likewise unacceptable,

since Muslims account for only r:oughly 40

percent of Bosnia's population.

As a result of this new Muslim asser

tiveness , however , the Bosnian party's policy vis-a-vis the Islamic
community has become tinged with ambivalence. 10
In fact , Church-state relations are generally more complex in
Bosnia , as they are also in Croatia and Serbia.

This is a result pf

the greater complexity of issues, the Serb-Croat rivalry in the former
two republics (producing a generally higher level of tension iQ inter�
e thnic and thus in interconfessional relations ) , and the great�r
degree of factionalization both within the political elites and within
the respective religious bodies.
related,

The first two issues are inter

for it is the greater ethnic and confessional heterogeneity

which , in part , accounts for the greater complexity of issues.

The

political elites here , unlike those in Slovenia and Macedonia, repeat
edly return to the theme of "clerico-nat ionalism , " warning the
Churches to steer clear of nationalist causes. 1 1
There are also
specific features that distinguish one republic from the other:
Croatia,

in

there is the traditional rivalry between the archbishops of

Zagreb and Split , as well as the presence of theologically liberal
clergy in the Christianity Today organization.

In Bosnia ,

the Fran

ciscan presence adds a complicating variable to the equation;

and in

Serbia , the institutional weakness of the Serbian Orthodox Church has
meant that it has been less capable than the C�tholic Church of mount
ing effective challenges to regime policies.

And where factionaliza

tion is concerned , there have been tension$, in these republics ,
b e tween theological liberals and theological conservatives in the
Catholic Church ,

b etween Franciscans and diocesans again in the

·
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Catholic Church, b etween lower clergy and hierarchy in the Serbian
Orthodox Church,

and between "liberals" (in different senses) and
"conservatives" where the political elites are concerned. 1 2
I n the other federal units , finally, Church-state issues are less

salient,

even though the press has occasionally accused both Muslims

and Orthodox in Kosovo of "meddling" in nationalism.

Voj vodina is

distinct in being the only federal unit with a large number of active
Protestant churches.

In V o j vodina , as in Montenegr o , Church-state

relations are distinctly low key.
Overall, thus, institutional decentralization and the federaliza
tion of p olicy-making have resulted in the emergence of discrete
policy arenas.

The distinct concerns and differences in factionaliza

tion assure that religious policy will vary from republic to republic.
Behavioral-organization theory tells us that decentralization,
such as that found in Yugoslavia,
results in departmentalization and an increase in the bifur
cation of interests among the sub-units in the organization.
The maintenance needs of the subunits dictate a commitment
to the subunit goals over and f ove their contrib ution to
the total organization program.

f

Bifurcation of interests is also reinforced b y differences in the
training and experience of administrators in different republics.
Given local environmental differences, March and Simon inform. us,
the struggle for internal control not only affects directly
the content of decisions, but also causes greater elabora
tion of sub-unit ideologies. Each subunit seeks success by
fitting its policy into the official doctrine of the large
organization to legitimize its demands.
Such a tactic in
creases the intfi nalization of subgoals by participants
within subunits.
·

This tactic also o bscures the differences b etween p olicies of the
federal sub-units , since each sub-unit presents its own policy , of
necessiiy, as consistent with the overall policy of the orgatilzation,
in this case the LCY.
1,

The resulting pattern is reflected in Figure 7-

which is a modified version of a model originally devised b y

Selznick.
Religious Developments in Croatia and Bosnia
The recent Church-state frictions in Yugoslavia are a case in
point and bear out the relevance of organization theory.
the federalized Yugoslav context,

For within

these frictions have been localized

rather than a feature of nationwide developments.

In fact , it is

chiefly in Bosnia and Croatia that there have been prolonged polemics

7
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over religious conditions and religious activity.

Where Croatia is

concerned, the party's nervousness in the early months foll owing
Tito's death was quickened by Archbishop Kuharic's outspoken demands
for an expansion of ecclesiastical prerogatives ( e.g., in terms of
access to army recruits and to prisoners), and by 1981 , the atmosphere
in the regime's relationship with the Catholic Church was soured b y
mutual distrust, reciprocal polemics, and periodic "corrections" which
served, inter alia,

to sustain the polemics.

When the theologically

liberal Christianity Today publishing house ran afoul of certain
b ishops in 1 9 81 , the regime quickly endorsed the Christianity Today
clergy--in a move that was interpreted on the Church's side as unwar
ranted interference and that probably was, if anything, embarrassing
to the clergy of Christianity Today.
Y et despite repeated reports of petty harassments of Catholic
clergy in Croatia, 1 6 LCC policy in the sphere of religion remains the
outcome of factional politics.

In a striking example of this,

Nenad

I vankovic, longtime specialist on religious affairs for the Zagreb
newspaper,

Vjesnik,

and spokesman for more moderate elements in the

establishment , defended Popes Pius XII and John Paul II , in 1 9 82 ,
after their public disparagement by former Croatian Assembly President
Jakov Blazevie.l7
The regime press sometimes charges individual priests with having
Ustase sympathies and with singing old Ustase songs.
these accusations are not always accurate.

It appears that

What they accomplish,

however , is to foster the idea that ecclesiastical involvement in
nationalism is apt to be fascistic.
v

The liberal Croatian theologian,

I

Fr. Tomislav Sagi-Bunic , recently replied to such equations in an
extended discourse on The Catholic Church and the Croatian People.
Re j ecting any notion that the Church is entitled to identify itself
V

with the Croatian nation, Sagi-Bunic proceeded to distinguish between
I

''healthy nationalism" (or "patriotism") and "unhealthy nationalism , "
and defended the Catholic Church's "care" for the language , culture ,
history, and welfare of the Croatian community. 1 8 While the book was
well received in the regime press, Croatian nationalism remains a
delicate sub-theme in relations between the party and the Catholic
Church.
While the religious scene in Slovenia , Macedonia , and arguably
Croatia too, has been unshaken by any dramatic new developments in the
1 9 80s , the same cannot be said for Bosnia-Herzegovina , where two
distinct events have dramatically heightened the religious self-aware
ness of Catholics and Muslims.
The first of these was the alleged appearance of the Madonna , on
June 2 4 , 1 9 81 , to six Herzegovinan children (fo� the first time) in
the village of Medj ugor j e in the district of ditluk.

The regi�e

9

initially blamed Franciscan Father Jozo Zovko for concocting the
miracle and put him in prison on a three-and-a-half year sentence ,
charging him with manipulating the believers in the interest of fo
menting Croatian secessionism and anticommunism. 1 9 The LC Bosnia
Herzegovina was worried that the steady stream of pilgrims to M_ e d
j ugor j e , which soon began to flow (at the rate of 6 , 000- 1 0, 000 per
day), would stimulate Croatian nationalism and complicate interconfes
si6nal relations in the republic.

Yet while the party was trying to

debunk the alleged miracle , the Church itself remained cautious ,
appointing an investigatory commission to study the miracle and pass
j udgment on it.
Meanwhile ,

the children continue to report almost daily visita

tions by the Madonna, who , they say, has confided various "secrets" to
them. 20 Pilgrims and tourists continue to come to Medj ugorje, includ
ing many from abroad , and some 25 , 000-26 , 000 people took part in
third-anniversary masses in Medj ugor j e in June 1 9 84 .

By then the .

authorities were starting to see the phenomenon in a new light and
began to talk of developing hotels and other touristic facilities in
the area in order to attract hard currency from foreign visitors.

As

of mid- 1 9 85 , the chief frictions produced b y the miracle seem to be
intra-Church (between the diocesan Bishop of Mostar, who disputes the
authenticity of the miracle , and the Franciscans, who benefit from it
1
and endorse it), rather than between Church and regime. 2
In the case of the Muslims , on the other hand , it has b een much
harder to draw the line between what is religious and what is nation
alist , and correspondingly harder to persuade the Muslim clergy to
restrict themselves to "purely religious" functions.

It is this

complication , above all, that accounts for the sharp amb ivalence in
religious policy in Bosnia,

where the Muslims are able to build

mosques without any problem--there were 2, 037 in Yugoslavia as a whole
in 1 9 76 , 22 and many more have b een constructed since then--opened a
new theological faculty in 1977,
nal, Islamska misao , in 1 9 79.

and launched a new theological jour

The regime has even allowed theological

students to study in the Middle E�st.

In essence , thus, the party has

been broadly tolerant of Islam.
At the same time , the regime h�s shuddered at any hint of pan
Islam or Muslim nationalism. _As Zagreb Professor Milan Kangrga put it
in 1982,
the danger of Islam lies not in itself, as such , but rather
in the tendencies contained within it, which do not shrink
from openly and militantly advocating that Marx's science
(which is European par excellence) be replaced by the Is-
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lamic religion and the Koranic way of life. 23
And this was , in fact , tQ.e charge later levellc:� d against a gr�mp ,of
thirteen "Muslim nationalists" tried in Sarajevo in summer 1983. The
leading defendants--Om�r Mustafa Behmens and Alia �ustafa Izetbego
vic--were given jail sentences of fifteen and fourteen years respect
ively, while most of the others received sentences of between five and
ten years in duration.

They were said to have made a visit "of an

exclusively inimical character" to an unnamed Islamic country , to have
propagated an " Islamic Declaration" which called for the "purifica
tio�' of Bosnia, and to have begun organizing for the establishment of
an " Islamistan" in Bosnia. 24 The trial attracted a great deal of
foreign attention, including in the Middle East ,

but did not have any

particular consequences for the practice of Islam in Yugoslavia�
except to stimulate Muslim self-awareness, at least temporarily.
Basic ---vs. ����
Routine �����
Decisions

-------

Within the federalized, factionalized context of Yugoslav policy-

making, religious policy must be attuned to diverse factors, including
the need to maintain a good image in the West (the source of tourists
and credits), the desirability of avoiding offense to Middle Eastern
countries , 25 the importance of maintaining the loyalty of Orthodox
Macedonians in the face of Bulgarian claims ,

the fear that religious

organizations may adopt the role of spokesmen of national communities,
and so forth.

At the same time , as I have indicated in the foregoing
pages, the "rational actor model" 26 is largely irrelevant to under
standing religious policy in Yugoslavia.

On the contrary,

religious

policy can be better interpreted as the variegated outcome of pre
established procedures and routines, conflicting interests and views,
accidents of policy sequence , and strategies of "satisficing." 27 Her
bert A. Simon once put it this way:
Discussions .of administrative centralization and decentrali
zation often bog down on the question: "Who really makes
the decisions [in an organization] ? " Such a question is
meaningless--a complex [policy] is like a great river, draw
ing from its many trib utaries the innumerable component
8
premises of which it is constituted. 2
The formulation of religious policy in Yugoslavia is thus fully conso
nant with the expectations engendered by organization theory.
Yet it is clear also that the LCY (or Tito personally) has inter
vened at different junctures,

especially prior to 1980, to set forth

certain fundamental principles.

A recent instance involved the case

of a Marija Car of Duga Resa who was expelled from the party in July
1983 because she allowed her newborn child to be baptized in church.

I
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Although not a believer herself,
insistence of her husband.

she consented to the baptism at the

She appealed her expulsion to the Commis

sion for Statutory Problems of the LCY , thus bringing the central
party apparatus into the dispute.29 The Statutory Commission upheld
her expulsion, however, and took the occasion to reaffirm party policy
of excluding all believers from membership.
Other similar interventions could be cited.

One way to under

stand the relationship between these interventions on the part of the
LCY and the more usual federalized policy-making context is in terms
of the distinction between b asic decisions and routine de cisions.
Basic decisions involve long-range commitments, broad questions of
fundamental direction, and, in the Yugoslav context, any questions of
cadres policy.

Such decisions are broad in scope , infrequent, and

taken at the highest level; they are apt to be taken under duress or
pressure.

Routine decisions , by contrast , have little impact of

consequence on the organization but contribute to the formation of the
policy environment.30 They are generally taken at lower levels of the
organization, affect narrowly defined issues of a specific nature , and
are apt to be reversible.

Routine decisions lie exclusively within

the domain of the federal units.
The Serbian Orthodox Church as Loyal Opposition
While the Catholic Church and the Islamic community are in many
ways as strong as ever, the Serbian Orthodox Church seems to be expe
riencing a gradual decline.

There are several tell-tale signs.

First , secularization , as a natural process weaning believers from
their faith , has hit the Serbian Church the hardest.

A 1 9 8 2 opinion

poll , reported in Ilustrovana politika , found that while a third of
youth in traditionally Catholic regions are religious,

the proportion

in traditionally Serbian Orthodox regions is about three percent ,
while a 1 9 8 4 survey in the Ni� area (in Serbia ) found few real b e 
lievers.3 1 Second, the Serbian Orthodox Church has the least favora
ble clergy/believer ratio of the three maj or denominations.

For while

there is one� for every 1 , 25 0 Yugoslav Muslims and one Catholic
priest for every 2, 239 Catholics,

there is orily one Serbian Orthodox
priest for every 5 , 7 1 4 b elievers. 32 Third , the Serbian Orthodox
Church is the least organized of the three maj or religious bodies when
it comes to religious instruction. 33 Fourth , the Serb ian Orthodox
Church has been by and large less successful than the other religious

organizations in obtaining permits to build new churches. 34

And

finally, the authorities keep a tighter rein on Serbian Church publi
cations , requiring that every religious publication in Serbia b e
submitted for approval fifteen days before i t is t o appear in pub
lic.35 This, of course, means that a daily or even a weekly publica-
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tion--possible for the Catholic Church in Slovenia and in Croatia ,
where prior approval is not required--would make little sense for the
Serbian Orthodox Church.
Seen in this light , it is not surprising that Pravoslavlje , the
organ of the Belgrade Patriarchate ,

unlike its Catholic counterpart,

Glas koncila, is a generally uncontroversial publication, content with
commemorating the saints and discussing theological matters.

Nor is

it surprising, perhaps , that the current Serbian Patriarch , German ,
has taken pains to underline his loyalty to socialist Yugoslavia ,
observing at one point , "All of those who are opposed to a socialist
Yugoslavia are also the opponents of the Serbian Church and are our
3
enemies . " 6
Still , Pravoslavlje does occcasionally speak out critically-
usually in defense of Serbian national interests in the face of per
ceived threats in the "b orderlands."

When the Croatian nationalist

euphoria reached a crescendo in 1970-71 ,

the Serbian Orthodox Church

was on hand to "defend" the Serbs from Croatian nationalism.

When

Kosovo , the ancient homeland of the Serb ian people , explode d in Al
banian-nationalist riots in 1981,

Pravoslavlje issued an "Appeal for

the Protection of the Serbian Inhab itants and their Shrines in Ko
3
sovo." 7 And throughout the period since the secession of the Mace
danian Orthodox Church in 1 967,

the Serbian hierarchy has interpreted

its repudiation of Macedonian ecclesiastical autocephaly as a Serbian
nationalist cause.
In the late 1 9 5 0s and early 1 9 6 0s , the Serbian Orthodox Church
felt it had a protector in Aleksandar Rankovic , Yugoslavia's vice
3
president and head of the security police. 8 When he fell from power
in 1 9 6 6 , the Serbian Church felt it had lost its protector--a fear
that seemed confirmed when the Macedonian clergy began to press for
autocephaly four months later.

Since that time , the Serbian hierarchy

has found it difficult to escape the feeling that the Serbian Orthodox
Church has been singled out b y the authorities for discriminatory
3
treatment. 9 The Church continues to complain of interminable delays
in the granting of permission to build new church edifices in Belgrade
and Split , of the failure of authorities to honor an agreement to
return sacred artifacts from the Zagreb historical museum , and of
"conduct of certain governmental organs toward the Church (which] is
not always in accord with the constitution." 40 In spring 1 9 84 , a
Serbian priest even complained that "in other republics religious
people can be members of the party and send their children to reli
gious instruction while here it is not allowed. " 4 1 In other words ,
some Serbian clergy at any rate b elieve that the federalization of
religious policy works against the Serbian Church.
Yet Serbian Church difficulties should not be exaggerated.

The

!
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Church has been able to open new churches both in Serbia and in other
republics, for example at Tutnjevac in August 198 1 ,
(in Croatia) in October 1 982,
1 984,

at Nova Gradiska

and at Jasenovac (Croatia) in September

and local authorities at Celje (Slovenia) granted permission in

1 9 8 2 for the construction of a Serbian Orthodox Church to cater to the
roughly 1 , 000 local Orthodox believers. 4 2 In addition, the Serbian
Orthodox Church laid the foundation stone for a new four-story theolo
gical faculty in Belgrade , in May 1 9 8 4 , which, when completed, will
accommodate two hundred students.

The ceremonies were officiated by

Patriach German and attended, inter alios , by various representatives
of the Serbian governmen t , the Serbian Academy of Sciences , and the
University of Belgrade. 4 3 Finally , the Serbian Orthodox Church has
maintained a lively publishing activity,
proud,

of which it is justifiably

capping this recently with the publication of the first offi

cial Orthodox Church translation of the New Testament into Serbo
Croatian.44 Hence , when the secular press reports that relations
between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state are "generally

good , " 4 5 this is , in fact , generally accurate.

At the same time ,

there is much lingering distrust on both sides.
The Protestant Challenge
The authorities have become accustomed to the three traditional
religions of Yugoslavia (Orthodox y , Catholicism, Islam), and vice
versa.

But the presence and proselytization of newer Protestant sects

present a challenge to both--a challenge with which both the authori
ties and the traditional religious organizations find it difficult to
deal .
The chief Protestant Churches in Yugoslavia are:

the Reform"'d

Christian Churc h , which caters largely to Hungarians in Vojvodina ,
with about 6 0 , 000 members; the Evangelical-Lutheran Churches , with
72, 385 members (in 1 976), many of them Vojvodinan Slovaks; the Pente
costal Church,

with 5 , 000 members;

the Seventh-Day Adventists,

with

10, 600 members; the Baptist Church, with 3, 500 members; the Methodist
Church , with 3 , 700 members; the Jehovah's Witnesses , with 1 0 , 000
adherents; and the Church of the Brethren, with adherents in Serbia,
Croatia, and Slovenia.46
Of these ,

the Pentecostals, the Baptists, the Seventh-Day Adven

tists, and the Jehovah's Witnesses have been the most active in prose
lytizing.

In fact ,

the Jehovah's Witnesries publish their Kula

strazara (Watchtower) publication in more than 32, 000 copies:

1 4 , 000

copies in (Latinic) Croatian , 8 , 000 in (Cyrillic) Serbian , 1 0 , 000 in
Slovenian , and an unspecified number in Macedonian.

The Jehovah's

Witnesses and the Adventists have been active in Serbia since at least
the early 1 9 70s , when they started to try to win converts from the
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Orthodox Church.

Mija Milacic, a district party official , reported at

the time that these Churches were
insolently selling their publications through the mails.
Baptist magazines are reaching some addresses on a COD
basis. The Jehovah's Witnesses are distributing their lite
rature in the villages of the Morava valley. The Seventh
Day Adventists sell their publications to Serbian Orthodox
folk at the church in the monastery of Ravanica
Unpleasant
4
scenes between the two groups frequently occur. 7
Similar reports emerge periodically, and ''smaller Protestant communi
ties" have been accused , in particular , of disrupting Catholic and
Orthodox church services and of proselytizing on the grounds of Catho
lic and Orthodox churches.48
On the whole ,
estants.

the authorities seem to prefer to ignore the Prot

Intermittently, one may read passages, in the secular press ,

such as the following:
The Adventist sect is active in many of our cities.
[Adven
tists] are very isolated and very dangerous.
They are
recognizable by the fact that they refuse to work or go to
school on Saturdays or to carry weapons in the service.
They pay money when they join the sect , and it is difficult
to leave. They are dangerous because their children must
also be members of the sect.
They do not agree to any
compromises, and they condemn every outside authority. They
are exclu � vely against self-management and self-managing
democracy.

�

Because of their energetic proselytization,

the Adventists and Jeho

vah's Witnesses will probably remain anathema to the authorities in
any of the federal units.

Yet there have also been Protestant clergy

who have achieved reputations for cooperativeness with the authori
ties, such as Dr. Juraj Struharik , Bishop of the Slovak Lutheran
Church in Yugoslavia.50
Conclusion
The argument has come full circle.

I began by stressing the

limits to the commonality of religious policy in Yugoslavia , high
lighting different religious conditions and legislation in the repub
lics, and the very substantial autonomy enjoyed by the latter.
seems that there are also limits to heterogeneity.
be seen in the Marija Car case,

Now it

These limits can

and likewise in the general distrust

with which authorities in any republic view certain neo-Protestant
groups especially.
There are other limits.

Organization theory teaches that policy

making in an organizational setting is conditioned by individual
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motivations ,

associational group loyalties (e.g. ,

Catholicism, or peasant farmers),

to Serbia ,

or

and organizational � tructure, 5 1 and

that decision-making should be viewed as the process of "drawing
conclusions from premises."5 2 The latter equation traces decisions to
processes of information-processing in which premises derived from

party affiliation, regional con�erns , group loyalties , and person�!··
development affect the way in which information is received, manipu
late d , and acted upon.

Moreover , information-processing cannot be

disassociated from organizational structure , and one is entitled to
posit that structurai commonalities will produce common policy procli
vities and common decision-making dilemmas.

Both organizational

structure (which is very much the same from republic to republic) and
basic premises set limits, therefore, on policy heterogeneity.
The essay began with five questions about religious policy in
Yugoslavia.

On every scor e , the question has been answered on the

side of complexity.

Religious policy in Yugoslavia is susceptible to

the influence of considerations of policy in other realms, is worked
out in a factionalized , federalized environment in which formally
proclaimed "clear objectives" are often lost in a complex shuffle of
intervening variables , and in part for these reasons is moderately
heterogeneous across republics and across confessions.

In approaching

the subject matter, organization theory made sense of this complexity
by differentiating between basic decisions and routine decisions,

by

linking decentralization to the reinforcement of the bifurcation of
interests , and by stressing the importance of organizational struc
ture, group loyalties, and operational premises in policy-making.
At the same time , this essay has provided .a more particular
vindication of the approach of James March and Herbert Simon ,
approach referred to as behavioral organization theory.
tance of perception and group affiliation,

an

The impor

which is borne out by the

evidence , is nowhere stressed as much as in behavioral-organization
theory,

which,

in general, seems better attuned,

than other variants

of organization theory , to the complexities of the Church-state dy
namic in Yugoslavia.
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